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From Safe Harbour to Privacy Shield. The “medieval”
sovereignty on personal data
1. – Introduction
The European Commission has defined a new agreement for the trans-
border data flows from the European Union to the U.S. (1), sixteen years
after the Safe Harbor agreement (2), following the Edward Snowden’s
revelations (3) and a few months after the ECJ ruling on the Schrems case.
The first comment might be positive, because personal data, the digital
sap of our economy, is flowing again through the Atlantic. The European
Commission has achieved a compromise that has highlighted the strength
of the E.U. data protection model. Moreover, the forthcoming E.U. regu-
lation (General Data Protection Regulation) will safeguard the data of
European citizens. We can conclude that “all’s well that ends well”, ac-
cording to the Shakespearean (and Italian) proverb. Nevertheless, the
actual situation of the trans-border data flows looks different from this
rosy forecast.
If we look at the details concerning both the E.U.-U.S. agreement and
the broader topic of the international strength of the E.U. data protection
model, many elements suggest a more cautious optimism.
Like a sort of medieval town, the E.U. common framework on data
protection has created a legal wall around the information concerning
European citizens and only a few legal gateways give access to the valuable
asset represented by personal data. These include international bilateral
agreements (such as the Safe Harbor agreement and the new Privacy
Shield), standard contractual clauses, foreign regulations that provide ade-
quate levels of protection, binding corporate rules, and ad hoc contractual
clauses.
(1) See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Commission Implementing Decision pursuant to Di-
rective 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the
protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, draft and related Annexes. Available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-433_en.htm (accessed 29 February 2016).
(2) See 2000/520/EC: Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/
46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection
provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions
issued by the US Department of Commerce (notified under document number C(2000)
2441). Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000-
D0520:EN:HTML (accessed 5 February 2016).
(3) See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2014.
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In this light, the recent ruling of the judge of the “town” (the Euro-
pean Court of Justice) stated that one of these gateways was not secure
enough (weak enforcement of the Safe Harbour principles, lack of judicial
protection for EU citizens, potential risks due to the public/private sur-
veillance partnership) and temporarily closed it. Foreigners, who want to
have access to the gold of the town (i.e. our personal information), cla-
moured for the re-opening of the gateway. Now, a new smaller gateway
has replaced the previous one and access is possible through more restric-
tive conditions and only under the careful watch of different guards (data
protection authorities (4), ECJ, European Commission).
2. – From Schrems to Privacy Shield
Without metaphors, the Schrems case seems to reaffirm the strength
of the E.U. legal barrier that protects personal data. However, it actually
unveils the frail nature of this regulatory wall.
The ECJ judgment highlights that, according to Article 25 (6), third
countries should provide “a level of protection of fundamental rights and
freedoms that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the Eu-
ropean Union” (5). In these terms, the ECJ decision does not only affect
the Safe Harbour agreement, but also the new Privacy Shields and, above
(4) The Article 29 Working Party will publish its opinion on the Privacy Shield on
April 13. The Article 29 Working Party is an independent advisory body on data protection
and privacy, set up under Article 29 of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC and
composed of representatives from the national data protection authorities of the EU Mem-
ber States, the European Data Protection Supervisor and the European Commission. Ac-
cording to the Directives 95/46/EC and 2002/58/EC, this body is competent to examine
any question covering the application of the data protection directives in order to contribute
to the uniform application of the directives. It carries out this task by issuing recommenda-
tions, opinions and working documents. As the ECJ has recently pointed out in the case C-
362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd, 6
October 2015 (see paras 102 and 103), the data protection authorities may autonomously
“call into question whether a Commission decision that has found, on the basis of Article
25(6) of the directive, that a third country ensures an adequate level of protection is
compatible with the protection of the privacy and of the fundamental rights and freedoms
of individuals”.
(5) See European Court of Justice, C-362/14 (fn. 4), para 73: “The word ‘adequate’ in
Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46 admittedly signifies that a third country cannot be required
to ensure a level of protection identical to that guaranteed in the EU legal order. However,
as the Advocate General has observed in point 141 of his Opinion, the term ‘adequate level
of protection’ must be understood as requiring the third country in fact to ensure, by reason
of its domestic law or its international commitments, a level of protection of fundamental
rights and freedoms that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the European
Union by virtue of Directive 95/46 read in the light of the Charter”.
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all, all the different legal grounds for data transfers outside the EU borders
(i.e. third country regulations, standard contractual clauses, binding cor-
porate rules). From this perspective, the strength of the E.U. model seems
to be more formal than substantive.
Regarding the U.S., the previous experience of the Safe Harbour
agreement does not appear to be particularly positive in terms of efficacy
and enforcement (Connolly, 2013; Chester, 2014 (6)). When Safe Harbour
was established, the Federal Trade Commission committed to review on a
priority basis all referrals from E.U. Member State authorities, but no
complaints were received for the first ten years. Consequently, the FTC
decided to identify any Safe Harbour violations in all privacy and data
security investigations it conducted. Between 2009 and 2013, the FTC has
brought 10 enforcement actions against companies based on Safe Harbour
violations (European Commission, 2013). After the critical remarks ex-
pressed by the European Commission about the Safe Harbour agreement
(7), the number of FTC decisions concerning Safe Harbour violations
increased (28 in 2014, 15 in 2015) (8), but it seems far below the real
(6) Jeff Chester, executive director del Center for Digital Democracy, declared that
“Instead of ensuring that the U.S. lives up to its commitment to protect EU consumers, our
investigation found that there is little oversight and enforcement by the FTC. The Big Data-
driven companies in our complaint use Safe Harbor as a shield to further their information-
gathering practices without serious scrutiny. Companies are relying on exceedingly brief,
vague, or obtuse descriptions of their data collection practices, even though Safe Harbor
requires meaningful transparency and candor. Our investigation found that many of the
companies are involved with a web of powerful multiple data broker partners who, unk-
nown to the EU public, pool their data on individuals so they can be profiled and targeted
online”.
(7) See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of
EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU (fn. 10). See also EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,
Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in
various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and on transa-
tlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (fn. 2).
(8) Since there are not official stats about the FTC decisions concerning Safe Harbor
violations, the number of cases has been extracted from the FTC press releases available at
the following addresses: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/08/thirteen-
companies-agree-settle-ftc-charges-they-falsely-claimed; https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2015/04/ftc-settles-two-companies-falsely-claiming-comply-international;
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/11/truste-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-
consumers-through-its; https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/06/ftc-approves-
final-orders-settling-charges-us-eu-safe-harbor; https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-relea-
ses/2014/02/ftc-settles-childrens-gaming-company-falsely-claiming-comply; https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/01/ftc-settles-twelve-companies-falsely-clai-
ming-comply.
340 contratto e impresa/europa 1/2016
number of the companies that have falsely claimed to comply with the Safe
Harbor framework (Connolly, 2013 (9)).
With respect to the remaining legal grounds, the main concerns deal
with third country regulations and standard contractual clauses. Regarding
the decisions adopted by the European Commission on the adequacy of
the protection of personal data in third countries, (10) there is no evidence
about how the European authorities monitor the effective enforcement of
third country data protection regulations and whether they monitor and
review the amendments to these regulations and related practices.
As regards the standard contractual clauses, it should be pointed out
that clause II (c) of the Standard contractual clauses for the transfer of
personal data from the Community to third countries (controller to con-
troller transfers) (11) requires the data importer to warrant that “It has no
reason to believe, at the time of entering into these clauses, in the existence
of any local laws that would have a substantial adverse effect on the
guarantees provided for under these clauses, and it will inform the data
exporter (which will pass such notification on to the authority where
required) if it becomes aware of any such laws” (12). Therefore, the
adoption of the standard clauses does not exclude per se any assessment
of the level of protection provided by the third country. Moreover, accor-
ding to this clause, the E.U. data exporters should stop any data transfer
(9) In 2008, Galexia found that 208 organisations were making false claims of Safe
Harbor membership. In the 2010 update, the figure was 331 and in 2013 it was 427.
(10) The list of the Commission decisions on the adequacy of the protection of personal
data in third countries is available at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/international-transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm (accessed 2 February 2016).
(11) See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Commission Decision of 27 December 2004 amending
Decision 2001/497/EC as regards the introduction of an alternative set of standard con-
tractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries. C(2004) 5271. 2004/915/
EC. Annex SET II. See also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Commission Decision of 27 December
2004 amending Decision 2001/497/EC as regards the introduction of an alternative set of
standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries. C(2004)
5271. 2004/915/EC, Annex, clause 5(a).
(12) See the analogous wording of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Commission Decision of
5 February 2010 on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to pro-
cessors established in third countries under Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council. 2010/87/EU. Annex, clause 5(b) (“[The data importer agrees and
warrants:] that it has no reason to believe that the legislation applicable to it prevents it
from fulfilling the instructions received from the data exporter and its obligations under the
contract and that in the event of a change in this legislation which is likely to have a
substantial adverse effect on the warranties and obligations provided by the Clauses, it will
promptly notify the change to the data exporter as soon as it is aware, in which case the data
exporter is entitled to suspend the transfer of data and/or terminate the contract”).
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or provide further safeguards when they are aware that the foreign regu-
lations may have a “substantial adverse effect” on the guarantees provided
for under these clauses (Unabhaengiges Landeszentrum fuer Datenschutz
Schleswig-Holstein, 2015). Nevertheless, the standard clauses are often
used by E.U. companies adopting a “copy & paste” approach, without
any assessment of the mandatory rules that may affect the compliance of
third parties that are based outside the E.U.
Finally, with regard to the new Privacy Shield, the legal framework is
still uncertain. Although, a different and more collaborative approach is
evident on the other side of Atlantic (13), the new agreement is mainly the
result of a political agreement between the European Commission and the
U.S. counterparts, in which the European Data Protection Authorities
(hereafter DPAs) have not been directly involved.
This kind of negotiation is carried out by the Commission. However, it
is the DPAs that have to examine any claims concerning personal data
transfers to a third country, when the data subject contends that the law
and practices in force in this country do not ensure an adequate level of
protection. In these cases, when the national supervisory authority comes
to the conclusion that the arguments put forward in support of such a
claim are well founded, that authority must be able to engage in legal
proceedings.
According to the Schrems ruling, “it is incumbent upon the national
legislature to provide for legal remedies enabling the national supervisory
authority concerned to put forward the objections which it considers well
founded before the national courts in order for them, if they share its
doubts as to the validity of the Commission decision, to make a reference
for a preliminary ruling for the purpose of examination of the decision’s
validity”.
Therefore, if the European DPAs are not convinced of the level of
protection provided by the new agreement, they may begin a new lawsuit
that leads to a new ECJ preliminary ruling on the E.U.-U.S. data transfer
agreement (14). For these reason, the Privacy Shield is still “sub judice”
(13) The intention to provide a more effective protection of EU citizens’ rights con-
cerning personal information is evident not only in the new agreement, but also in the
approval of the Judicial Redress Act, which gives European citizens the rights that are
granted to U.S. citizens under the Privacy Act of 1974 and the right to sue the United
States for unlawful disclosure of personal information . The official text of the Judicial
Redress Act is available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1428 (ac-
cessed 8 March 2016). See also European Court of Justice, C-362/14 (fn. 4), para 95.
(14) See European Court of Justice, C-362/14 (fn. 4), paras 63-66 and 102-104.
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and the European DPAs (the Article 29 Working Party) will give their
opinion on it in April (Article 29 Working Party, 2016). The Commission
should take this opinion into account in the following adequacy decision.
Although, it is hard for the DPAs to express a negative opinion on the
new agreement, due to the political and economic interests related to the
data flows between the E.U. and U.S., they may express remarks that can
affect the final decision of the European Commission.
Regarding the content of the new agreement, criticisms have been
expressed by privacy associations, since the crucial aspects concerning
the U.S. disproportionate data processing for surveillance purposes is still
largely unsolved (15). In this sense, the agreement is a compromise that has
a limited impact on the privacy threats enlightened by the ECJ in the
Schrems case.
The agreement can be divided into two parts: 1) the Privacy Principles
(Annex II); 2) the official representations and commitments provided by
the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Government and the U.S.
Department of Justice (Annexes I, III to VII).
The first part, on privacy principles and their enforcement offers a
more detailed and higher protection than the Safe Harbor agreement. The
risk-based approach, the principle of accountability of data gatherers,
specific procedures for the complaints filed by E.U. data subjects and
DPAs, and an active and ex officio monitoring of company compliance,
are the main positive aspects of this new agreement. There are still grey
zones (e.g. the opt-out model for non-sensitive data, the length of the
complaint procedures), but the Privacy Shield reduces the gap between
the U.S. and the E.U. standards of data protection.
Nevertheless, this is a provisional result, since the new E.U. regulation
will introduce different changes and a more risk-oriented approach, which
will probably recreate a substantial gap between the safeguards provided
by the E.U. regulation and the protection provided by the Privacy Shield
Framework Principles.
The second part of the agreement (Annexes I, III to VII), which
primarily concerns the access and use of personal data transferred under
the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield agreement by U.S. public authorities, is ne-
(15) See the letter send by 27 privacy rights organizations to the Chairman of the
Article 29 Working Party, the Chair of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home
Affairs and the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the EU
https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/PrivacyShield_Letter_Coalition_-
March2016.pdf.
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cessarily more vague. It is based on political assurances (e.g. “the U.S.
government has assured the Commission that ‘any bulk collection activities
regarding Internet communications that the U.S. Intelligence Community
performs through signals intelligence operate on a small proportion of the
Internet’.”) and future implementations (e.g. the Privacy Shield Ombuds-
person (16)). For these reasons and in absence of significant changes in the
U.S. surveillance practices, many privacy associations are sceptical about
the effective impact of this part of the new agreement.
3. – Conclusions
From a global perspective, the outcomes of the Schrems case and the
re-definition of the U.E.-U.S. bilateral agreement on data transfer, which is
still in progress, lead to a more thoughtful reflection on the future of the
E.U. data protection model.
We should take into account the uncertainty about the effective ap-
plication of this model, both within the E.U. borders (Kenneth et al.,
2015) and outside (third countries regulations, standard clauses), and
the political and economic reasons that make it weaker, as demonstrated
by the compromise agreement with the U.S.
In this light, the main risk is the creation of a gap between the model
as defined by regulations and various agreements and the effective provi-
sion of a high level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. The
EU provisions on data flows, and on EU data sovereignty, seem to have
mainly a declaratory nature, as demonstrated by the more formal than real
safeguard of personal data existing in many EU countries and by the lack
of control on the enforcement of the contractual solutions for trans-border
data transfers.
This highlights the political nature of the E.U. data protection regu-
lation, that can be understood only in the broader context of the multi-
stakeholder dimension of global data protection, which involves different
economic areas (US, EU, China, etc.) and different organizations (COE,
APEC, OECD, UN). From this perspective, this legal wall built around
European data, with its effects on international data flows, seems to be an
instrument to reinforce the E.U. leadership in the drafting of a future
global regulation for data protection, rather than a guarantee of an effec-
tive higher standard of protection.
(16) According to the draft of the Privacy Shield agreement, the Ombudsperson will
receive and respond to individual complaints regarding U.S. signals intelligence activities.
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